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IPO Underpricing in China Growth Enterprise Market 
by 
ZHENGYANGLIU 
August 7, 2012 
The phenomenon of IPOs’ underpricing has been investigated of stock markets around 
the world. In this paper, I focus on 203 IPOs from 2009 to 2011 extracted from 
Shenzhen growth enterprise market. Underpricing is directly related to turnover ratio, 
initial P/E ratio, prior year’s ROE, subscribe multiple and free float. The study shows 
that the initial abnormal return on the secondary market is significantly positive. This 
study also finds that the initial return in the primary market is negatively related to the 
free float and IPO P/E ratio. And it is positively related to the prior year’s ROE, 

















1.1 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
IPO refers to a private company offering its shares to the public for purchase for the 
first time. The purpose of IPO is to raise capital to expand a business.  
1.2 Background of IPO 
The formation of the two stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen in 1990 was 
unprecedented in socialist China. The government allowed enterprises to raise funds 
by issuing corporate bonds and stocks to the public. IPO underpricing is a 
comprehensive phenomenon in many markets, and has been noted as one of the 10 
puzzles in financial research (Brealey and Myers, 1991). A common perception is that 
the underpricing of IPO is a challenge to market efficiency, and that is may hurt 
emerging firms trying to raise capital for expansion (Loughran et al., 1994).  
The growth enterprise market started in October 2009, with the aim of supporting 
small and medium size enterprises, high and new technology enterprises and growth 
enterprise. Companies in growth enterprise market (GEM) usually have high growth, 
high proportion of intangible assets, business uncertainty characteristics and small 




According to finance theory, the risks and benefits are positively related. The larger 
degree of risk, the higher risk yields. GEM companies’ high growth can quickly 
reduce P/E ratio in the short term, the mature market usually give higher valuations of 
listed companies. In NASDAQ market, the listed company average P/E ratio is more 
than 100 times. In China, GEM companies’ P/E ratio is 50 times. After the research, I 
found the average underpricing rate is higher than 50%, with the highest being 
209.7%.  
The first empirical evidence on IPO underpricing comes from the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission in 1963. Since then a number of subsequent empirical 
researches have confirmed the results that IPOs tend to be substantially underpriced in 
the US, as well as internationally. Ibbotson (1975) found that 120 companys’ IPOs 
have 11.4% of the excess profits in the United States for the first time. And then he 
also found that there is the existence of “hot issue” markets, which he defines as 
periods during which the initial performance of IPOs is especially high. Moreover, he 
found evidence of a strong concentration of IPO activity in certain periods. In the past, 
some scholars have proposed a series hypothesis to explain the IPO price phenomenon 
name by asymmetry hypothesis, the signal hypothesis, underwriter’s reputation 
hypothesis and investor’s behavior hypothesis. 
1.3 The pricing of IPO 
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If a company wants to issue stock it must receive a permit from China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and then work with an investment bank or a 
financial institution, who underwrites the offering. The company together with 
underwriters determine what type of security to issue, issue date, the best offering 
price, and the amount of distribution. The most important is how to decide the exact 
price of IPO.  
Jonathan (2008) argues that “Within the region, there are two approaches of pricing 
shares in an IPO. The first one is to sell shares at a fixed price. This is the approach 
used by most of the region, including companies on the Dubai Financial Market. The 
second is the book building method, used widely and also the DIFX's method of 
choice.”  
 
1.4 Rational of the study  
In China, the equity market is very young compared to the developed countries. So, 
it means there is a large space for Chinese equity market to develop. In addition, in 
November 2001, China joined the WTO (World Trade Organization). And then the 
government open up its securities market gradually in the following years. So 
understanding of the performance and the characteristics of Chinese markets is 
important for both domestic and foreign investors who want to enter the Chinese 
markets. This is the reason why China was chosen as the subject in this study. 
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GEM board is a financing platform for those companies which are small and 
high-growth but need money to expand its business. Most firms in GEM are high-tech 
innovation enterprises. The analysis of underpricing of firms’ IPOs in GEM is 
instructive and can offer investors a good prediction of growth firms’ IPOs which can 
make them gain the abnormal return. 
 
1.5 Objective of study  
In this paper, I used the regression analysis to test the relationship among degree of 
underpricing(DUP), ROE in prior year, win a label rate, turnover ratio on the first 
trading day , starting P/E ratio and Institutions subscribe multiples. The research seeks 
to find the correlation between independent variables and dependent variable, and find 
the coefficients of each independent variable. After using the regression model, use 
growth firm’s information to predict the degree of underpricing when IPO. 
 
1.6 limitation of this paper 
GEM board in China has only been in existence for two and half years. Therefore, 
there isn’t sufficient data in this regard to substantiate my conclusions. As we know, 
there are a lot of factors that can influence the pricing of IPO. This paper just focus on 
company’s internal factors, and ignore the external factors such as underwriter’s 
reputation、agency cost、duration time、economic environment and so on.  
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1.7 Organization of the study  
This paper is organized into four chapters. Chapter 1 discusses the background and 
objective of the paper. Chapter 2 is a review of relevant sources regarding the IPOs 
underpricing and influence factors. Then, it is followed by the methodology for 
analysis and model specification in chapter 3. The results of the data analysis are 
presented and discussed in chapter 4. Finally, in chapter 5 conclusions and 















2.1 Underpricing of IPOs 
IPOs are usually underpriced because uncertainty surrounding the issue. The less 
liquid and less predictable the shares are, the more underpriced they will have to be in 
order to compensate investors for the risk they are taking. Ibbotson (1975) first finds 
that IPOs have positive initial returns and names it the mystery of IPOs. Ritter (1991) 
has researched 1526 IPOs between 1975 and 1984 and finds that the average IPO 
initial return is 14.3%. In table 2.1, it shows 33 countries IPO initial abnormal return 
in the past. As we can see, China has the highest initial return of 135%, while France 
has the lowest return of 4.2%. The total average abnormal return is 30.8%, China’s 
IPO initial return has 3 times more than the average level.  
 
2.1.1 Information asymmetry hypotheses 
A large number of researchers believe that the underpricing IPO can be explained by 
information asymmetry hypotheses. Because of the issue company knows more about 
the value of the shares than the investors. Therefore, this hypothesis states that the 
company must underprice its stock to attract investors to participate in the IPO. Baron 
and Holmstrom (1980) argue that information asymmetry exist between underwriters 
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and issuers, with underwriters having superior information to the issuers. In order to 
solve this moral hazard, underpricing is necessary. According Rock (1986) there is 
information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. In order to keep 
the uninformed investors leave in the market, underwriters need to underprice IPOs.  















2.1.2 Underwriter’s reputation hypothesis 
Some researchers use reputation of underwriters to explain IPO underpricing 
phenomenon and document that the better underwriters will price IPOs closer to its 
intrinsic value. Therefore, the reputation of underwriters is negatively related to the 
degree of underpricing(DUP). Tian and Zhan (2000) examine the relationship between 
the reputation of underwriters and IPO underpricing in China, and find that 
underwriters’ reputation have no explanatory power on Chinese IPO underpricing, due 
to the important role played by the regulator in IPO pricing. 
As a result of investment bank underwriting a lot of stock and have a large number of 
potential customers, therefore, it can set up its reputation by using appropriate IPO 
underpricing and by extension making a lot of money by relying on its reputation. 
Again due to the change of the environment, investment bank also change its method 
to make money by using its reputation. Carter and Man-aster (1990) make a empirical 
study by using IPO data in US market in 1980s. Their results show that the reputation 
of investment bank gives a risk information to the market. Due to the less amount 
financing of high risky small company, those investment bank with higher reputation 
will reject young and high risky small company to the IPO market. Thus, the company 





2.1.3 Investor’s behavior hypothesis. 
Ljungqvist (2004) argue that the behavior theories assume that those irrational 
investors will raise the price of the IPO shares higher than the true value, or that 
issuers are subject to behavior biases and therefore fail to put pressure on the 
underwriting banks to have underpricing reduced. Those investors who came into the 
market later will learn experience from the former investors and ignore themselves 
private information to imitate former investor’s behavior. If less early investors think 
issue price is high, but they can affect the decision of following investors, which will 
make the IPO fail. Conversely, if less early investors think issue price is low and 
worth to purchase, it will increase the demand of the stock. This phenomena is called 
“cascade effect”, also it can be defined as IPO market herd behavior.   
Ritter (1998) suggest that the IPO market may be subject to the bandwagon effects. 
A positive cascade or bandwagon means that the IPO is under-priced. Amihud, Hauser, 
and Kirsh (2001) support this hypothesis by showing that IPOs tend to be either 
undersubscribed or hugely oversubscribed with very few moderately oversubscribed 
in Israel. 
 




Miller (1997) uses investor’s opinion divergence hypothesis to explain the 
phenomena of IPO underpricing and long-term under-performance. He assumes that 
IPO pricing is similar to a bidding process. The number of new investors and the value 
estimation of stock look like a normal distribution. When all investors purchase one 
share, those investors should be the maximum number shareholder of the company. At 
this time, the price is the market average price. In fact, due to the optimistic predict the 
value of new stock; investors want to buy more than one share. So that only less 
investor can purchase the stock at clearing price, even if there exist enough stock in 
the market. Therefore, the valuation of optimistic margin investors are on the right of 
average price, it means margin investor want pay more than normal investors. The 
stock price was determined by optimistic investors.   
The level of investor’s opinion divergence will decrease as time goes on. In the short 
term, the future is full of uncertainties, but the optimistic investors have full of 
confidence about the future of company. Those investors are willing to pay more than 
the intrinsic value of the stock. As time goes on, more and more real information 
about IPO appear in the market, the divergence between investors and the number of 
optimistic investors will decrease. The market clearing price is close to the intrinsic 
value. Compared with the price of first trading day, the long-term market value has 




2.1.5 The Investment Banker’s Monophony Power Hypothesis 
Baron (1982) offers a different, agency-based explanation for under-pricing. In this 
theory, he argues that the issuing firm can’t assess its own true value and must 
depends on the auditing of outside companies and the investment bank to report 
accurate information. The issuing firm and investment bank agree to an IPO contract 
based on the report that the investment bank gives the issuing firm concerning its 
value.  
To induce the underwriter to put good effort to market shares, it is optimal for the 
issuer to permit some under-pricing, which is some kind of monitoring costs for the 
issuer to the underwriter. Another interpretation of underwriters’ superior knowledge 
of market conditions is that using under-pricing to expend less market effort and to get 
in with themselves with buy-side clients. There is undoubtedly some truth to this, 
especially with less experienced issuers (Ritter 1998). 
However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) find that when underwriters themselves 
go public, their shares are underpriced at the similar rate even though there is no 
agency problem. This evidence does not favor the Baron hypothesis, although it does 
not refute it either. One explanation could be underwriters may want to under-price 




Loughran and Ritter(2002) study the relationship between the issuer and underwriter 
and they think if underwriter have the right to decide the share placement, this 
decision will not automatically service issued company’s maximum interest. When 
necessary, the underwriters deliberately set a low issue price and left more money 
aside, and then take these shares placement to customers. 
 
2.1.6The changing issuer objective function hypothesis 
This hypothesis means keep the managerial stockholding and other characteristics 
under the constant condition. The goal of issue firm has changed from financing 
income maximization to accept IPO underpricing. TimLoughran and JayRit—ter(2004) 
study US IPO market, and found that the IPO average underpricing rate is 7% in 
1980s, and then this rate increased to 15% between 1990-1998. However, during the 
internet bubble times it increased to 65% in 1999-2000. They believe that the change 
of underpricing is derived from the change of issuers' objective function during the 
internet bubble times. The issuer’s objective function changes may come from two 
factors: one is the securities analysts recommend report has received more and more 
attention from the issuer, at the same time which underwriter should be choose depend 
on if it has excellent analysts.  
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Hoberg (2003) argue that each industry usually has only five star analysts, this led to 
the enterprise face a demand exceeds supply market. And the underwriter as a lead 
role is more and more obvious, IPOs underpricing rate is also higher than before.  
The other problem is publishers are increasingly willing to accept high price; in fact, 
it is a way to get the gray income for decision maker. Since the 1990s, some 
underwriters for venture capitalists and issuing companies establish personal sell stock 
management account so that placement hot sell IPO stock for them, actually at the end 
of last century this phenomenon are common, the goal is to influence the issuer to 
chose the underwriter. The management’s grey income will stimulate enterprises to 
choose those underwriters who have a higher underpricing reputation brokers to 
underwriting their stocks, such as this image is called spinning. 
 
2.2 Initial turnover of IPOs 
The initial turnover rate on the first trading day in China IPO market is very high. 
Zhu and Tian (2002) study the daily turnover rate from days 1 to 40 for over-priced 
and underpriced Chinese IPOs respectively. They find that the average initial daily 
turnover rate is 57.91%, which is much higher than that in developed stock markets. 
The higher the initial turnover rate, the higher the initial returns. It indicates that there 
exist high speculations on Chinese IPOs market. The daily turnover starts to drop from 
the second day of trading, and reaches equilibrium around the tenth trading day in 
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China. The volatility of daily turnover for the overpriced IPOs is higher than that for 
underpriced IPOs. 
 
2.3 Theories focusing on shares allocation  
Shares allocation model was created by Benveniste and Spindt(1989). In this model, 
underwriters collect information from investors by themselves, for the issuers, it can 
reduce the level of IPO underpricing. Sherman(2000) If in the future underwriters sell 
stock to investors during the process of IPO, it will decrease the IPO underpricing 
level. A lot of researchs about IPO placement problem are very focus on the 
difference between institution investor and personal investor. Because institutional 
client is different from retail customers, their scale determine its advantage in 

















Data and methodology 
3.1 Data sources  
In this paper, I collected the data from the Shenzhen stock exchange website. Some 
of company’s data is hard to find. Therefore, I used 203 company’s data for my 
research. These data contain turnover ratio、IPO P/E ratio、prior year’s ROE、subscribe 
multiple and free float from 2009 to 2011. The data of prior year’s ROE come from 
the financial report of each company. The data of turnover ratio come from the Fang 
zheng security software. And the data of win a label rate come from the website of 
Eastern wealth. 
Table 3.1: Industry distribution of GEM Company 
 




Auto 4 Electron device 44 





14 Papermaking 1 
Hospitality 2 Environmental 
protection 
10 
Commerce 1 Ceramics 2 













Chemicals 27 plastic product 8 
Architecture 4 Glass 3 
Electronic 
information 
77 Instrument 14 





3.2.1 Assumed condition 
For convenience of research, I made some assumptions as follows; 1) Don't consider 
subscription costs, including opportunity cost and subscription fees. 2) Don't consider 
transaction cost, including brokerage and stamp duty. 
 
3.2.2 Underpricing estimate  
1) Degree of underpricing 
                  
Where     is the closing price of stock i in the first trading day 
   is the offering price of stock i 
If DUP>0, it means the security is underpricing 
If DUP<0, it means the security is overpricing 
If DUP=0, it means the security is correct priced  
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3.2.3 Adjusted degree of underpricing 
 Eliminates the effect of market overall revenue level from initial rate of return. 
                               
Where     is the closing price of stock i in the first trading day 
   is the IPO price of stock i 
   is the closing Shenzhen indexin the first trading dayof stock i 
  is the last trading day’s closing index of GEM before IPO of stock i 
 
3.2.4. Model and variables  
I choose the DUP as a dependent variable, and use those factors, which have effects 
on DUP, as independent variables to build multiple linear regression models. 
DUP=β0i +β1i*PE+β2i*TURNOVER+β3i*RATIO1+β4i*RATIO2+β5i*WINRATIO+ 
β6iRATIO3+ei 
Where DUP=degree of Underpricing 
β 0i=Interception of the regression 
β 1i=coefficient for P/E ratio 
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PE=initial P/E ratio 
β 2i= coefficient for turnover ratio 
TURNOVER=turnover ratio on first exchange day  
β 3i= coefficient for ROE of prior financial year 
RATIO1= prior year’s ROE  
β 4i= coefficient for free float 
RATIO2= free float in IPO  
β 5i= Coefficient for win a label rate 
WINRATIO=win a label rate 
β 6i= Coefficient for subscribe multiple 
RATIO3= subscribe multiple for each stock  
Predict the signs of the coefficients 1) the initial return of the primary market is 
negatively related to the free float; 2) the initial return is positively related to the prior 
year’s ROE: 3) the initial return is positively related to the subscribe multiple 4) the 
initial return is positively related to the turnover rate; 5) the initial return is negatively 
related to the IPO P/E ratio. 
For convenience, I use the Xi to instead the independent variables.  
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X1= initial P/E ratio 
X2=win a label rate 
X3=turnover rate on the first trading day 
X4= subscribe multiple 
X5= prior year’s ROE 
X6=free float 
 
3.2.5 White’s General Heteroscedasticity Test 
In statistics, when the standard deviations of a variable, monitored over a specific 
amount of time, are non-constant. 
The possible existence of heteroscedasticity is a major concern in the application of 
regression analysis, including the analysis of variance, because the presence of 
heteroscedasticity can invalidate statistical tests of significance that assume that the 
modeling errors are uncorrelated and normally distributed and that their variances do 
not vary with the effects being modeled. White’s General Heteroscedasticity Test, 
which requires reordering the observations with respect to the X variable that 
supposedly caused heteroscedasticity, or the BPG test, which is sensitive to the 
normality assumption, the general test of heteroscedasticity proposed by White does 
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no t rely on the normality assumption and is easy to implement. The White test 
proceeds as follows: 
Step 1. Given the data, we estimate the following equation and obtain the residuals 
ui . 
          Y=β0+β1X1+β2X2+β3X3+β4X4+β5X5+β6X6+ ui  
Step 2. We then run the following regression: u^2=Y+Y^2 That is, the squared 
residuals from the original regression are regressed on the original X variables or 
regressors, their squared values, and the cross product(s) of the regressors. Obtain the 
R2 from this regression. 
Step 3. Under the null hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity, it can be shown 
that sample size (n) times the R2 obtained from the auxiliary regression asymptotically 
follows the chi-square distribution with df equal to the number of regressors 
(excluding the constant term) in the auxiliary regression. That is, 
 
where df is degree of freedom. In our example, there are 27 df since there are 27 
regressors in the auxiliary regression. 
Step 4. If the chi-square value obtained from the above equation exceeds the critical 
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chi-square value at the chosen level of significance, the conclusion is that there is 
heteroscedasticity. If it does not exceed the critical chi-square value, there is no 
heteroscedasticity. 
 
3.2.6. Detecting Autocorrelation 
The most celebrated test for detecting serial correlation is that developed by 
statisticians Durbin and Watson. It is popularly known as the Durbin–Watson d 
statistic, which is defined as 
 
The mechanics of the Durbin–Watson test are as follows, assuming that the 
assumptions underlying the test are fulfilled: 
1. Run the OLS regression and obtain the residuals. 
2. Compute d from above formula.  
3. For the given sample size and given number of explanatory variables, 
find out the critical dL and dU values. 
4. Now follow the decision rules given in Table 3.2. For ease of reference, 








Source: R.Carter, William E. and Guay C.(2010) 
Given the level of significance α, 
ut = ρut−1 + εt. 
1. H0: ρ = 0 versus H1:ρ > 0. Reject H0 at α level if d < dU. That is, there 
is statistically significant positive autocorrelation 
2. H0: ρ = 0 versus H1:ρ < 0. Reject H0 at α level if the estimated (4 − d) < dU, that 
is, there is statistically significant evidence of negative autocorrelation. 
3. H0: ρ = 0 versus H1: ρ ǂ0. Reject H0 at 2α level if d < dU or (4 − d) <dU, that is, 
there is statistically significant evidence of autocorrelation, positive or negative. 
Table 3.2 Durbin-Watson d test: decision rules 





Analysis and Test 
This paper uses Stata/SE 12.0 edition to run a regression using a sample size of 203 
IPOs companies in China growth enterprise market (GEM).  
 
4.1 The results of adjusted degree of underpricing (ADUP) 
In table 4.1, it shows the results of sample’s DUP of each stock. We can see, most of 
the IPOs abnormal return always positive, and a few of them are negative. The 
average ADUP is 28.0136%, with the minimum benefit -16.67% and maximum is 
199.01%. It means under the present issue system, the underpricing phenomenon 
exists in China’s IPO market. 
Table 4.1 Part of sample stock’s ADUP  



























































































































































































































































4.2 Regression results 
 
In table 4.2, we can see the regression results. The R-squared of this model is 0.5293 
means the independent variables can explain 52.93% of dependent variable. The test 
of the regression function: F = 35.28, Prob(F-statistic) = 0.000, which means the 
parameters of each variables are not equal to zero and all independent variables have 
affects on the degree of underpricing. Therefore, this model has pass the significance 
test. 
Explanations of regression results: 
1) The relationship between PE ratio and DUP: The parameter of starting P/E 
ratio is β 1=0.0017035 which has positive relationship with the DUP, it means the 
high P/E ratio indicates the company has a good development potential and it can 
attract more investors. From the investor’s view point, the higher P/E ratio means 
25 
 
a good development potential, which is known by informed player. But for those 
uninformed player, they worry the stock price is overpriced, so it increase the 
information asymmetry level. As compensation, they need a high underpricing 
rate. 
2) The relationship between win a label rate and DUP: The parameter of win a 
label rate isβ 2= -.0128134 which has negative relationship with the DUP. This 
rate reflect the demand and supply of new stock, if the rate is low, it means the 
stock demand more than supply and the IPO price will higher than its true value. 
The t value is equal to -4.33 which means it is significant.  
3) The relationship between turnover rate and DUP: The parameter of turnover 
rate is β3=0.839176 and t=10.32 which has positive relationship with the DUP and 
it is very significant. The higher turnover rate, the higher attraction of the stock. It 
also increases the liquidity of the stock and it is benefit to find the true value of the 
stock. 
4) The relationship between subscribe multiple and DUP: The parameter of 
subscribe multiple is β4=0.0039414 and t=6.65which has positive relationship with 
the DUP and it is very significant. This ratio reflect the fondness degree of 
institution investors, the higher this ratio, the higher attention from institution 
investors. If the stock attack a lot of institution investors to subscribe, it means this 
stock is underpricing and it price has more space to increase. 
5) The relationship between prior years ROE and DUP: The parameter of firm’s 
ROE of prior year is β 5=0.2207151 which has positive relationship with the DUP. 
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The t value is equal to 3.17 which means it is significant. As we know, ROE 
reflect the income level of shareholder and it is a tool to measure the effectively of 
capital use. The higher the ratio, the more return from the investment.   
6) The relationship between float rate and DUP: The parameter of free float rate 
is β6=-0.0684037 which has negative relationship with the DUP. But the t=-0.09, 
means the relationships is not significant.  
Table 4.2 Regression results 
 
Source SS df MS Number of obs =     203 
F(  6,   196) =   35.28 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     = 0.5293 
Adj R-squared = 0.5145 












dup Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
X6 -.0684037 .7982091 -0.09 0.932 -1.642585 1.505777 
X4 .0039414 .0005926 6.65 0.000 .0027727 .0051101 
X2 -.0128134 .0009644 -4.33 0.006 -.0318328 .006206 
X5 .2207151 .001559 3.17 0.016 .5915879 1.1501577 
X3 .839176 .0003241 10.32 0.000 .6787933 .9995586 
X1 .0017035 .0007315 2.33 0.021 .0031461 .0052608 
_cons -.2607703 .1620482 -1.61 0.109 -.5803523 .0588117 
 
4.3 The result of White’s General Heteroscedasticity Test 
The table 4.3 shows the result of the heteroscedasticity test. I can get the R
2
 value 
from the result and after calculation, I also can get the χ 2 value equal to n*R2 = 
203*0.1171=23.7713. 
Null hypothesis            H0: there is no heteroscedasticity 
27 
 
Alternative hypothesis       H1: there is heteroscedasticity 
According to the rule, if the chi-square value obtained from the equation not exceeds 
the critical chi-square value at the chosen level of significance, the conclusion is that 
there is no heteroscedasticity. In white test regression model, the degree of freedom is 
27, so the critical chi-square value is 40.113, which is larger than 23.7713. Therefore, 
we do not reject the null hypothesis, there is no heteroscedasticity. 
Table 4.3 White test result 
Number of obs =     203 
F(  2,   200) =  6.58  
Prob > F      =  0.0002 
R-squared     =  0.1171 
Adj R-squared =  0.0947 
Root MSE      =  1.6495 
         usq |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|        [95% Conf. 
Interval]  
          y |  -.3958885   .0298356   -0.69   0.492    -.4547212   -.3370558 
        ysq |   .6424541   .0226524    0.03   0.972    .5977859    .6871222 
       _cons |   .0441336   .0068644     6.430.000     .0305977    .0576695 
 
4.4 The result of Autocorrelation test 
After the OLS regression analysis, we get the parameter of each independent variable. 
And then use the data to calculate all the residual value as showed in Appendix B. 
Using the below formula, I get the “d” value is equal to 1.821856 
                                         
                            = 12.21344018/6.703844969=1.821856 
28 
 
Null hypothesis:             H0: ρ = 0 
Alternative hypothesis:        H1: ρ ǂ0. 
Reject H0 at 2α level if d < dU or (4 − d) <dU, that is, there is statistically significant 
evidence of autocorrelation, positive or negative. 
In this sample, it has 200 sets of data and 6 independent variables. It means n=200, 
k=6, use the table “Durbin-Watson Statistic: 5 Per Cent Significance Points of dL and 
dU”, we can find the du=1.735 and dL=1.613. 
Because du=1.735<d=1.821856<4-du=2.256, so we can’t reject the null. It means ρ 

























The purpose of this paper was to examine the factors which affect GEM IPOs 
underpricing. My models incorporate variables reflect China’s unique economic and 
institutional framework. Underpricing of GEM IPO is extremely high and far exceeds 
that observed in other emerging economies. In contrast to NASDAQ, the degree of 
underpricing of China’s GEM is much higher.  
In my regression model, the factors considered are indicate that inverse relationship 
with win a label rate and free float, while the others are positive. China’s IPO market 
has many unique features that make it an interesting environment to investigate. The 
results clearly show very high levels of underpricing of GEM shares and we establish 
reasons for this. China’s equity markets are expected to expand rapidly in the coming 
years as the state and individual entrepreneurs tap investors to help finance the 
economic restructuring of SOEs and fund the expansion of privatized firms. China 
will, therefore, provide a major investment destination for both domestic and global 
investors. One concern investors have, however, is their lack of knowledge about 
China’s markets. Hopefully my study provides some insights and some understanding 





5.2 Recommendation  
 
Since IPO underpricing phenomenon exists in GEM (growth enterprise market). I 
have some following suggestions to firm’s that decide to go further.  
First, the research of IPO had better separate the sample to different industries which 
can provide a deep analysis for the mispricing in GEM board. Second, with the 
purpose of make this paper more accurate, we also need take more variables into 
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Appendix B:  Data of the error term  
 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix D: The sample stock’s ADUP  
stock ADUP stock ADUP stock ADUP 
300240 0.6292 300173 0.0708672 300106 1.53973 
300239 1.99009 300172 0.137025 300105 0.597381 
300238 1.46878 300171 0.00460233 300104 0.482933 
300237 0.229522 300170 -0.03564 300103 0.599329 
300236 0.438381 300169 0.2662 300102 0.782367 
300235 0.457018 300168 -0.117729 300101 1.16849 
300234 0.2696 300167 -0.138266 300100 0.760462 
300233 0.0922613 300166 -0.130151 300099 0.585033 
300232 -0.0766749 300165 -0.163069 300098 0.099111 
300231 0.292775 300164 0.145475 300097 0.500268 
300230 0.118427 300163 0.102746 300096 0.451763 
300229 0.133233 300162 0.109689 300095 0.615571 
300228 0.202864 300161 0.0727462 300094 
-0.0041586
9 
300227 0.264094 300160 -0.0416714 300093 0.367532 
300226 0.191778 300159 0.525578 300092 0.207725 
300225 -0.0670143 300158 0.00792784 300091 0.175548 
300224 0.130689 300157 0.230947 300090 0.343612 
300223 -0.0754324 300156 0.15269 300089 0.140054 
300222 -0.0240938 300155 -0.0245306 300088 0.5053 
300221 -0.0019333 300154 0.0269688 300087 0.0901876 
300220 0.531092 300153 0.0153 300086 -0.0558667 
300219 0.135975 300152 0.304774 300085 0.104586 
300218 0.0288222 300151 0.316729 300084 0.131267 
300217 0.162775 300150 0.808746 300083 -0.0520667 
52 
 
300216 0.154784 300149 0.522843 300082 -0.0944588 
300215 0.0669895 300148 0.580412 300081 0.0174932 
300214 -0.0488 300147 0.158538 300080 -0.0182885 
300213 -0.0999364 300146 0.342564 300079 0.0434007 
300212 -0.0919106 300145 0.129795 300078 0.10731 
300211 0.142001 300144 0.237592 300077 0.800829 
300210 0.232073 300143 0.331911 300076 0.0531538 
300209 -0.113053 300142 0.505263 300075 0.280559 
300208 -0.0652 300141 1.008131 300074 0.446439 
300207 0.119222 300140 0.334882 300073 0.759633 
300206 -0.0535 300139 0.37992 300072 0.755988 
300205 -0.0775 300138 0.232233 300071 0.6983 
300204 -0.0498095 300137 0.503536 300070 1.1803 
300203 0.074 300136 0.623601 300069 0.45143 
300202 0.163752 300135 0.114123 300068 0.346967 
300201 0.0753429 300134 0.0683808 300067 0.341149 
300200 -0.059789 300133 0.585594 300066 0.752606 
300199 -0.04128 300132 0.356387 300065 0.748276 
300198 -0.0576065 300131 0.204322 300064 0.351277 
300197 0.164409 300130 0.078916 300063 0.354661 
300196 0.184399 300129 0.382987 300062 0.446249 
300195 -0.0591 300128 0.0476857 300061 0.603278 
300194 -0.0441636 300127 0.424178 300060 0 
300193 -0.0392585 300126 0.0622823 300059 0.4284 
300192 0.220712 300125 0.317582 300058 0.185344 
300191 0.0440811 300124 0.291672 300057 0.146602 
300190 0.115605 300123 0.185723 300056 0.762821 
53 
 
300189 0.10615 300122 0.0269079 300055 0.242231 
300188 0.2399 300121 0.457058 300054 0.0779784 
300187 0.2147 300120 0.267905 300053 0.249153 
300186 0.0183364 300119 0.316167 300052 0.1468 
300185 -0.0247 300118 0.359005 300051 0.097094 
300184 0.265 300117 0.394792 300050 0.341932 
300183 0.09831 300116 1.26588 300049 0.21573 
300182 0.252818 300115 0.333147 300048 0.270205 
300181 0.230149 300114 0.5693 300047 0.208167 
300180 0.0543148 300113 0.630552 300046 0.266156 
300179 0.325332 300112 0.437746 300045 0.302533 
300178 0.469223 300111 0.429843 300044 0.323409 
300177 0.242057 300110 0.575552 300043 0.169835 
300176 0.267456 300109 1.2223 300042 0.342472 
300175 0.254732 300108 0.551597 300041 0.272051 
300174 0.0557167 300107 0.467768 300040 0.266691 
 
 
 
 
